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THE DOCTOR WILL SEE YOU NOW: 
AN ARGUMENT FOR AMENDING THE LICENSING PROCESS 
FOR HANDGUNS IN NEW YORK CITY 
Alexander C. DePalo
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With events such as the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre,1 the 
2011 shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords,2 and the more 
recent shootings at the Empire State Building,3 in Aurora, Colorado,4 
and at Sandy Hook Elementary,5 gun control is often thrust into the 
limelight.6  Much debate and discussion ensues, but until recently, 
very little action has ever taken place.7  In 2010, an estimated 14,748 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Nautical Sci-
ence, United States Merchant Marine Academy.  I would like to thank my family, especially 
my parents, siblings, and in-laws for their continued patience, love, and support.  Without 
them, nothing in my life would be possible.  I would like to extend a special thanks to Pro-
fessors Samuel Levine and Rena Seplowitz for their guidance on this topic.  Also, I am 
greatly appreciative to the talented individuals on the Touro Law Review who were im-
mensely helpful and patient during the editing process, especially Jonathan Vecchi.  Lastly, 
special thanks to Tara Breslawski for editing countless drafts and for giving me confidence 
when at times I did not have confidence in myself. 
1 Leon Rubinstein, NO GUNS, NO MASSACRE. SIMPLE, PALM BEACH POST (Apr. 29, 
2007), available at 2007 WLNR 8119296. 
2 The Shooting of Gabrielle Giffords: The Tears of Tucson, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 15, 
2011), available at 2011 WLNR 786611. 
3 Abby Rogers, Jeffrey Johnson Used a Gun Brought to NYC Illegally To Shoot Ex-Co-
Worker Five Times, THE BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 
18137075. 
4 Alison Campsie, Mayor Calls for Gun Law Reform Views, HERALD (July 21, 2012), 
available at 2012 WLNR 15285499. 
5 Mark Pazniokas & Arielle Levin Becker, Panel Will Examine Shooting Gun Control, 
Mental Health Under Review, NORWICH BULLETIN (Jan. 6, 2013), available at 2013 WLNR 
1232094. 
6 Abby Rogers, How the Denver Shooting Will Shape the Debate on Gun Control, THE 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 15254638. 
7 Alexandra Jaffe, Gun-Control Debate Heats Up, But There’s Little Consensus, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL ONLINE (July 22, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 15674161.  On Janu-
1
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homicides occurred in the United States with 68% of those commit-
ted with a firearm.8  In New York City alone, there were 515 homi-
cides in 2011; 61% were committed with a firearm.9  New York City 
boasts some of the most restrictive gun laws in the country, many of 
which have come under strict scrutiny as to their constitutionality.10  
But are the laws effective in preventing individuals who are not legal-
ly permitted to possess a firearm from owning one?  Can a person in 
New York City, who is mentally unstable, apply for a handgun li-
cense and obtain one? 
Individuals with a severe mental illness commit approximate-
ly 10% of all homicides and 50% of all mass killings.11  This number 
equates to roughly 1,400 deaths per year.12  An estimated 319,000 
Americans with untreated mental disease are currently incarcerated, 
comprising 16% of the total inmate population.13  The United States 
General Accounting Office approximates that only half of the three 
million possible medical records indicating mental disease have been 
 
ary 15, 2013, New York passed the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforce-
ment Act of 2013 (NY SAFE) in response to the Sandy Hook Tragedy.  NYSENATE.GOV, 
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/s2230-2013 (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).  The Act 
bans possession of any high-capacity magazines regardless of when they were made or sold.  
Id.  Only clips able to hold up to seven rounds can be sold in the state.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
Act requires ammunition dealers to do background checks, similar to those for gun buyers, 
as well as the creation of a registry of assault weapons.  Id.  Those New Yorkers who already 
own such weapons would be required to register assault weapons with the state.  Id.  The Act 
also requires any therapist who believes a mental health patient made a credible threat of 
harming others to report the threat to a mental health director, who would then have to report 
serious threats to the state Department of Criminal Justice Services.  NYSENATE.GOV, 
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/s2230-2013 (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).  Lastly, it 
requires background checks for all gun sales, including by private dealers—except for sales 
to members of the seller's immediate family.  Id.  On April 17, 2013, the Senate rejected “a 
bipartisan compromise to expand background checks for gun buyers, a ban on assault weap-
ons and a ban on high-capacity gun magazines.”  Jonathan Weisman, Senate Blocks Drive 
for Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-control.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
8 2012 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WEEK (NCVRW) RESOURCE GUIDE, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2012/pdf/2012ResourceGuide.pdf (last visited May 1, 
2013). 
9 MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 2011 REPORT, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/ 
analysis_and_planning/2011_murder_in_nyc.pdf (last visited on May 5, 2013). 
10 Thomas Kaplan, Gun Rights Backers, Stung By Cuomo’s Law, Push to Undo It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/nyregion/activists-
seek-repeal-of-new-yorks-gun-control-laws.html.  
11 Fast Facts, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/ 
problem/fast-facts (last visited May 5, 2013). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
2
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filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the agency trusted 
with performing background checks.14  Those records are included in 
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”), 
which is cross-referenced during a background check.15  These back-
ground checks are a mandatory requirement within federal law under 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.16  Therefore, people 
who are legally ineligible to purchase a handgun may be able to do so 
simply because their medical history does not appear in the NICS. 
This Comment will explore the history of the Second 
Amendment and the radical changes case law has imposed on the 
Amendment in the last five years.  These changes have called into 
question whether New York City’s licensing scheme is constitutional, 
and whether the scheme is an effective tool in preventing crime.  
New York City has placed very stringent restrictions on an individu-
al’s right and ability to obtain a license to possess a handgun.17  Case 
law in New York indicates that a license to possess a handgun is a 
privilege, not a right, which is in stark contrast to recent Supreme 
Court holdings.18 
New York City, through its license application, attempts to 
keep weapons out of the hands of those individuals who are a danger 
 
14 Mental Health Reporting Policy Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 
(May 21, 2012), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/mental-health-reporting-policy-
summary/. 
15 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)-(t) (1994)) 
BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT; BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/legislation/backgroundchecks/bradylaw (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2013). 
16 Id. 
17 N.Y. PENAL Law § 400.00 (McKinney 2013) (requiring applicants to show that no good 
cause exists for the denial of the license in addition to being twenty-one years of age, of 
good moral character, without a felony conviction, and without any history of mental ill-
ness); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-131 (2012) (requiring applicants to pay a $340 licensing 
fee). 
18 In re Papaioannou v. Kelly, 788 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005) (holding that 
possession of a handgun license is a privilege, not a right, which is subject to broad discre-
tion of the New York City Police Commissioner, and the Commissioner, by statute has been 
delegated extraordinary power in such matters); In re Kaplan v. Bratton, 673 N.Y.S.2d 66 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (finding that issuing a pistol license is not a right, but a privilege 
subject to reasonable regulation); In re Williams v. Bratton, 656 N.Y.S.2d 626 (App. Div. 
1st Dep’t 1997); In re Tartaglia v. Kelly, 626 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995) 
(finding that possessing a handgun license is a privilege, not a right); Cf. District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 554. U.S. 570 (2008) (holding the Second Amendment is an individual right, 
not a collective right); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding the Se-
cond Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
3
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to both themselves and society.19  News sources indicate that mental-
ly ill individuals committed the shootings at the Empire State Build-
ing and at Sandy Hook Elementary.20  In other words, if stronger 
guidelines were implemented, these tragedies could have been avoid-
ed.  Unfortunately, if these individuals did not have a known history 
of mental illness on record or if their medical records were not re-
ported to NICS, then a background check—which is part of the li-
cense application—would never reveal a problem.21  This anomaly 
would render the New York City licensing scheme ineffective.  An 
examination of foreign countries’ licensing structures and their corre-
lating crime rates can assist state and city legislators in making an ef-
fective change.  A simple amendment to the license application that 
requires an applicant to undergo a psychological evaluation would 
rectify this alarming problem and ensure that those licensed to carry a 
handgun in New York City are legally competent to do so.22 
In this Comment, Section II will focus on the evolution of the 
Second Amendment within the Supreme Court, and analyze how the 
Court interpreted the Second Amendment to grant an individual, as 
opposed to a collective, right to bear arms.  A doctrinal, textual, and 
consequential study of the Amendment will assist with this endeavor.  
Section III will examine the New York State and New York City li-
censing schemes.  This Section will explore the jurisprudence of    
these schemes, constitutional challenges, and their overall effective-
ness.  Section IV will evaluate the proper scrutiny courts utilize when 
evaluating possible Second Amendment violations.  Lastly, Section V 
 
19 Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
20 Dr. Keith Ablow, Prediction—Mental Illness May Have Prompted Empire State Build-
ing Shooting, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 24 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/24/ 
prediction-empire-state-building-shooter-will-turn-out-to-be-mentally-ill/; Kevin Fobbs, 
‘Three Strike’ Mental Illness Violence Law May Have Prevented Adam Lanza Slaughter, 
RENEWAMERICA (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/fobbs/121223. 
21 Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal Background Check System Put Guns 
in the Hands of Killers, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, Nov. 2011, 
http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2012). 
22 Regrettably, even the most rigorous background checks cannot prevent all mentally ill 
individuals from illegally obtaining a weapon.  Adam Lanza, the perpetrator in the Sandy 
Hook shooting, stole the weapons he used from his mother.  If background checks were 
combined with stringent limitations on gun possession, this dangerous scenario might be fur-
ther reduced.  Jim Fitzgerald et al., How It Happened . . . Adam Lanza Killed His Mother, 
Took Her Guns and Killed 26 People at The School, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Dec. 14, 2012, 
10:19 PM), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2012/dec/14/how-it-happened-adam-
lanza-killed-his-mother-took-/. 
4
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will propose an additional provision requiring a mental examination 
for each applicant prior to the issuance of any handgun license and 
will analyze whether such an amendment would pass constitutional 
muster.  This proposal is not a restriction on an individual’s right to 
bear arms, but rather a strong compromise between gun-right advo-
cates and gun-control lobbyists.  The overall goal of this amendment 
is to reduce the danger of guns by limiting access to firearms by men-
tally ill persons, which both sides agree is a worthwhile enterprise. 
II. BRINGING THE SECOND AMENDMENT INTO THE
 
TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”23  This phrase is em-
bedded in our popular culture, appearing both in magazines and pres-
idential debates.24  The National Rifle Association is arguably the 
most well known gun rights advocate and is routinely involved in lit-
igation fighting for an individual’s right to bear arms.25  Until recent-
ly, the Supreme Court had not explained how the Founding Fathers 
intended these twenty-seven words to apply.26  Scholars have exam-
ined many different aspects to determine the appropriate interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment including the actual text, the history 
behind the Amendment, our governmental structure, doctrinal law, 
and possible consequential effects.27  A limited discussion of this 
background is necessary to understand how the Second Amendment 
functions in modern society. 
A. Doctrinal 
Unlike other amendments to the Constitution, the Second 
 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
24 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 641-42 
(1989); Patrick Jonsson, Obama vs. Romney 101: 4 Ways They Compare on Gun Control, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2012/0909/ 
Obama-vs.-Romney-101-4-ways-they-compare-on-gun-control/Second-Amendment. 
25 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. City of 
Chi., 393 F. App’x. 390 (7th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 854 
F.2d 1330; 761 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n, 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985). 
26 Heller, 554 U.S. at 616; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
27 Levinson, supra note 24, at 643. 
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Amendment is not specifically interpreted in a plethora of case law.28  
In the 236-year history of our nation, the Supreme Court did not 
make any broad-reaching determinations on the application or scope 
of the Amendment until 2008.29  In that year, the Court explicitly 
stated that the right to bear arms is an individual right,30 which ex-
tends to the several states through the Fourteenth Amendment.31  This 
created an influx of litigation challenging state licensing schemes and 
forced many states, including New York, to review their require-
ments to determine whether local handgun laws are in fact constitu-
tional.32 
The first noteworthy case in which the Supreme Court direct-
ly addressed how the Second Amendment applied to state govern-
ments under the then newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment was 
United States v. Cruikshank.33  In 1873, members of a white militia 
attacked a Louisiana courthouse defended by black Republican 
freedmen.34  Members of the white militia were charged under the 
Enforcement Act of 1870 for conspiring to prevent African Ameri-
cans from exercising their right to bear arms.35  This federal law 
made it a felony for two or more people, as part of a conspiracy, to 
 
28 Id. at 640-41. 
29 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
30 Id. at 595. 
31 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
32 Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (holding New York’s licensing scheme did not com-
pletely ban the carrying of firearms and therefore did not violate the Second Amendment); 
Jackson v. City and Cnty. of S.F., No. C 09-2143 RS, 2012 WL 3580525, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 17, 2012) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in a 
challenge to San Francisco firearms ordinances); Hightower v. City of Bos., 693 F.3d 61, 65 
(1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges to Massachusetts’ concealed carry 
licensing scheme). 
33 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
34 Colfax Massacre: Blacks Slaughtered By White Supremacists, NEWS IN HISTORY.COM: 
A CHRONICLE OF AMERICA’S PAST (Apr. 13, 2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.newsinhistory.com/ 
blog/colfax-massacre-blacks-slaughtered-white-supremacists.  The attack occurred in the wake 
of a heated election for the governor of Louisiana.  Id.  The Republican candidate secured 
the seat.  Id.  The party’s goal was to ensure black suffrage and incorporate blacks into the 
political system.  Id.  Fearing retaliation from local Democrats, a group of freedmen and 
state militia attempted to protect the Grant Parish Courthouse in Colfax from a possible as-
sault.  Id.  Armed with rifles and small cannon, white supremacists attacked the courthouse.  
Colfax Massacre: Blacks Slaughtered By White Supremacists, NEWS IN HISTORY.COM: A 
CHRONICLE OF AMERICA’S PAST (Apr. 13, 2012, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.newsinhistory.com/blog/colfax-massacre-blacks-slaughtered-white-
supremacists.  The particular number of casualties as a result of the attack was never deter-
mined as many bodies were thrown into the Red River.  Id. 
35 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 544-45. 
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deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights.36  The Court 
dismissed the charges, holding that the Bill of Rights only restricted 
governmental powers and had no authority over private individuals or 
the states.37  The Court stated that “[t]he Second Amendment . . . has 
no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national govern-
ment.”38  In essence, because Cruikshank involved actions between 
individuals, and not state action, the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
applicable.39  At that time, the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer 
any rights granted by the Bill of Rights on the several states, and the 
Cruikshank holding restricted the application of the Second Amend-
ment only to the federal government.40  Therefore, this would allow 
any state to enact legislation to regulate guns in any way practicable. 
Cruikshank’s language and holding were reaffirmed in Press-
er v. Illinois.41  The defendant led a group of 400 men in a parade 
through the streets of Chicago.42  These men were trained and drilled 
with military weapons.43  The defendant was charged with violating a 
state statute, which made it unlawful for individuals, other than “the 
regular organized volunteer militia,” to organize and gather “as a mil-
itary company or organization . . . without the license of the gover-
nor.”44  The defendant argued that the state statute in question violat-
ed his Second Amendment right to bear arms.45  The Supreme Court 
disagreed and reaffirmed Cruikshank, holding that because the Se-
cond Amendment is only binding on the federal government, the 
State of Illinois could enact legislation restricting the rights of indi-
viduals to bear arms.46  This decision upheld a state’s authority to 
regulate the militia and was commonly cited to provide justification 
for state and local municipalities to pass laws that regulate guns.47 
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 553. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  At the time Cruikshank was decided, the incorporation doctrine was not yet devel-
oped.  Therefore, no rights embodied in the Bill of Rights were incorporated in the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 548-50 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 13th ed. 2009). 
40 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
41 6 S. Ct. 580 (1886). 
42 Id. at 581. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 580. 
45 Id. at 581-82 
46 Presser, 6 S. Ct. at 584. 
47 Id. at 585. 
7
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In another landmark case, United States v. Miller,48 the Su-
preme Court stated that an individual had a right to possess a weapon 
so long as the weapon bore a reasonable relationship to a well-
regulated militia and was currently in common use.49  The defendants 
in Miller attempted to transport a short-barreled shotgun across state 
lines.50  They were charged with violating the 1934 National Firearms 
Act, which regulated and taxed the transfer of certain types of fire-
arms, and required the registration of such arms.51  The defendants 
argued that the statute violated their Second Amendment right by re-
stricting their ability to keep and bear arms.52  The Court concluded: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less 
than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficien-
cy of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the 
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and 
bear such an instrument.  Certainly it is not within ju-
dicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordi-
nary military equipment or that its use could contrib-
ute to the common defense.53 
Therefore, if a weapon could contribute to the efficiency of a well-
regulated militia, then an individual could possess such a weapon.  
The Court never specifically articulated that the defendants were re-
quired to belong to a well-regulated militia to legally possess such a 
weapon, nor did it state that the weapon had to be used for military 
purposes.  However, many lobbyists have taken expansive views of 
the Miller decision to both extremes.54  Gun-control advocates claim 
Miller restricted the Second Amendment to apply only to individuals 
who were members of a state militia acting as part of the common de-
fense,55 whereas gun-right advocates allege Miller expanded the Se-
 
48 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
49 Id. at 178. 
50 Id. at 175. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 176. 
53 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
54 Dr. Michael S. Brown, The Strange Case of United States v. Miller, KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS.COM, http://www.keepandbeararms.com/information/XcIBViewItem.asp?ID=2337; 
David Kopel, Why United States v. Miller Was So Badly Written, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Feb. 27, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/02/27/united-states-v-miller/. 
55 Id. at 3. 
8
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cond Amendment to protect any weapon that is part of ordinary mili-
tary equipment.56  With these clearly conflicting views, it was not un-
til 2008 that the Supreme Court clarified how the Second Amend-
ment would apply, turning gun control upside down.57 
In 2008, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right to keep and bear arms in District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller.58  In Heller, the defendant was a Washington, D.C. 
special police officer who applied for a registration certificate for a 
handgun that he wished to keep in his home.59  At that time, the gun 
laws in the District of Columbia made it a crime to carry an unregis-
tered firearm, and yet prohibited the registration of handguns.60  The 
defendant’s certificate application was denied and in turn he chal-
lenged the law as an unconstitutional restraint on his Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.61  In a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court, for the first time in its history, held that “there seems to 
us no doubt, on the basis of both the text and history, that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”62  
However, because the District of Columbia is under federal jurisdic-
tion, the Court left open the question of whether the Second Amend-
ment only applied to the federal government or whether it was also 
applicable to the states.63  The Heller ruling was a turning point for 
gun-rights advocates and allowed for new litigation to challenge the 
constitutionality of state regulations restricting an individual’s right 
to keep and bear arms.64 
Finally, in 2010, the Supreme Court, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,65 held that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.66  The defendants, resi-
dents of the City of Chicago, challenged the constitutionality of a 
state statute that made it unlawful for an individual to possess a 
 
56 Id. 
57 Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
58 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
59 Id. at 575. 
60 Id. at 576. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 595. 
63 Christopher Keleher, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Death Knell for Illinois Hand-
gun Bans?, 96 ILL. B.J. 402, 405 (2008). 
64 Lindsey Craven, Where Do We Go From Here?  Handgun Regulation In A Post-Heller 
World, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 831, 844-55 (2010). 
65 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
66 Id. at 3050. 
9
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handgun without a valid registration.67  The statute also made it un-
lawful to register most handguns, effectively banning handgun pos-
session by most private citizens.68  The defendants argued that the 
statute was a violation of their Second Amendment rights and left 
them without a means of self-protection.69 
Until this time, the Supreme Court had not extended the Se-
cond Amendment to the states and allowed the several states to re-
strict firearms in any way practicable.70  The Court concluded that 
even though the Fourteenth Amendment may have been enacted to 
prevent state discrimination, it is generally understood to “protect 
constitutionally enumerated rights, including the right to keep and 
bear arms.”71  Both Heller and McDonald expanded the Second 
Amendment to its broadest application to date.72  The Second 
Amendment now applies to individuals for either self-defense or in a 
military setting, and is fully incorporated to apply to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.73 
B. Textual Interpretation 
The specific words that create an amendment often shed light 
on how the amendment should be interpreted within modern socie-
ty.74  There are two main arguments on either side of the discussion 
in terms of the text of the Second Amendment.  Pro-gun activists ar-
gue that the Second Amendment provides an individual right, which 
is applicable in areas of self-defense and self-preservation.75  Gun-
control activists argue that that the Amendment merely confers a col-
lective right for the people and does not apply outside the scope of 
the military.76  The Supreme Court settled this issue with its holding 
 
67 Id. at 3026. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 3027. 
70 See Presser, 116 U.S. 252; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 
71 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3077. 
72 See generally Marcia Coyle, Post-Newtown Gun Legislation Will Hinge on ‘Heller’, 
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202581822870&PostNewtown_gun_legislation 
_will_hinge_on_Heller&slreturn=20130110003954. 
73 See Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. 
74 See Thomas J. Walsh, The Limits and Possibilities of Gun Control, 23 CAP. U.L. REV. 
639, 642 (1994); Heller, 554 U.S. at 577-78. 
75 Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
76 Id. 
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in Heller by analyzing the text of the Amendment.77 
In order to perform a proper textual analysis, it is necessary to 
divide the Second Amendment into two parts.78  Justice Scalia, in his 
majority opinion in Heller, called these “parts” the prefatory clause 
and operative clause.79  Standing alone, the prefatory clause—well 
regulated militia and security of a free State—allows the basic inter-
pretation that the Second Amendment grants a collective right.80  A 
militia is a body of citizens enrolled for military service, called out 
periodically for drill, but serves full time only in emergencies81 and is 
“comprised of all males physically capable of acting in concert for 
the common defense.”82  “Well regulated” can imply a method of 
training.83  Clearly, if the government were to provide training, then 
the Amendment only applies to the collective and not the individual.  
However, New York required that “every able-bodied Male Per-
son . . . provide himself, at his own Expense, with a good Musket or 
Firelock” to participate in the militia.84  The issue then turns on 
whether these weapons were stored at an individual’s home or in a 
communal location.  Logically, if an individual could keep the weap-
on at his home, the right is individualistic; however, if the weapon 
had to be stored at a common place, then the right is enjoyed only by 
the collective. 
In the second phrase of the prefatory clause, the word “State” 
has profound meaning.85  The word appears several times in the Con-
stitution to refer to either the individual states or the nation as a 
whole.86  Examining other parts of the Constitution, when the word 
“state” implies the several states individually, modifiers such as 
“each,” “several,” “any,” “particular,” or “one” are used to set off its 
meaning.87  However, in the Second Amendment the word “State” is 
not modified, indicating that it refers to the several states in a collec-
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Levinson, supra note 24, at 644. 
81 See generally Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
82 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
83 Heller, 554 U.S. at 597. 
84 Walsh, supra note 74, at 653 (emphasis added). 
85 Heller, 554 U.S. at 597. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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tive sense.88  Most likely, the Founding Fathers intended the word 
“State” to apply to the whole, not just the part, as a free and inde-
pendent nation.89  Furthermore, this interpretation allows the militia 
to become a triple threat—repelling invasions from foreign nations, 
preventing domestic insurrection, and resisting tyranny, all of which 
are collective concerns.90 
On the other hand, the operative clause, which consists of 
“right of the people” and “keep and bear arms,” can easily be under-
stood as granting an individual right.91  The first phrase turns on the 
meaning of the word “people.”  This term is used several times in the 
Constitution, including the First, Fourth, and Tenth Amendments.92 
In the First and Fourth Amendments, the Constitution grants an indi-
vidual freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.93  On the contrary, the Tenth 
Amendment grants authority to the people for matters not reserved to 
the Federal Government or the several states.94  Justice Scalia, in Hel-
ler, bridges this gap by concluding that because the Second Amend-
ment deals with a right and not a reserved power granted by the Con-
stitution, the right must be enjoyed individually.95 
The term “keep and bear Arms” is an ambiguous phrase.96  As 
alluded to earlier, the word “keep” implies that an individual could 
store arms in a home instead of a public communal place.97  This 
would mean that individuals, not just a collective group, could gain 
access to weapons.  “Arms” may carry a multitude of different mean-
ings, but in general it is understood to indicate a weapon.98  However, 
the intended use of such weapon offers great insight into the purpose 
behind the Amendment.  If the weapon is to be used solely for the na-
 
88 Id. 
89 Sanjay Sanghoee, Gun Control: It’s Time to Challenge the Second Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sanjay-
sanghoee/gun-control-its-time-to-c_b_1759542.html (“As for the security of a ‘free State,’ 
the Founding Fathers likely meant the most imminent threat against the newly formed Unit-
ed States at that time, namely a foreign power, and not our own government.”). 
90 Heller, 554 U.S. at 597. 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
94 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
95 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-81. 
96 Id. at 582-86. 
97 See supra Part II.B. 
98 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-82. 
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tion’s defense, then it is difficult to argue that the Amendment grants 
anything other than a collective right.99  However, if the weapon 
could be used for self-defense and self-preservation, then an individ-
ual right would be more appropriate.100  Several state constitutions 
have incorporated this clarification and allow individuals to carry 
weapons for the protection of the state and their person.101  It has also 
been generally understood that individuals may hunt and participate 
in target shooting events for both survival purposes and leisure.102  
Under the collective view, these events are clearly outside the scope 
of the military for which the Second Amendment theoretically should 
apply. 
The operative and prefatory clauses can appear to be at odds 
because one seems to grant an individual right while the other grants 
a collective right.103  However, it is important to take the text in its 
entirety to determine its application today.104  If one is to interpret the 
Second Amendment as granting a collective right, then the purpose 
behind the Amendment could be destroyed.105  Many scholars agree 
that tyranny, which caused the American Revolution, was a major 
concern when drafting the Constitution.106  Accordingly, built into 
our structure of government are checks and balances to ensure that no 
one branch becomes more powerful than another branch of govern-
ment.107  Checks on the federal government by the several states are 
found embedded in the Tenth Amendment.108  The people are also 
empowered to revolt and protest against tyrannical government.109  It 
reasonably follows that part of this revolt includes the ability to take 
up arms against the government.110 
 
99 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
100 Heller, 554 U.S. at 594. 
101 Id. at 600-01. 
102 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 628-29); id. at 3108-09 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
103 See supra Part II.B. 
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 598-600. 
105 Id. at 599. 
106 Id. at 597-98; Levinson, supra note 24, at 651. 
107 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review). 
108 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
109 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
110 Heller, 554 U.S. at 598 (“[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms 
and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.”).  The Court is unclear as to whether 
tyranny refers to an external or an internal force.  See id.  However, this determination seems 
to be irrelevant because both can threaten the security of a free state, as demonstrated by the 
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If the government were allowed to disarm its citizens and the 
militia, then the built-in protection against tyranny offered by the Se-
cond Amendment is lost.111  Granted, this is an antiquated way to in-
terpret the Second Amendment because the fear that the national 
government would disarm the general public subsided by the 
1850s.112  In colonial times, the idea that the general public could 
wage war against their government was feasible as evidenced by the 
American and French Revolutions.  However, the possibility that the 
general public today could engage in a realistic war against our mod-
ern army seems unlikely.  If the government committed its forces 
against a modern-day domestic revolt, mass casualties would ensue 
for both sides, with the people, much more likely than not, on the los-
ing end. 
Nevertheless, the fear that gun laws will become so restrictive 
as to prevent self-defense is a credible concern.  More importantly, 
when looking at the text of an amendment, the Framers’ intent is par-
amount.113  Self-defense and preservation cannot be readily read into 
the Second Amendment without looking at the historical context.114  
At the time the Amendment was adopted, hunting and shooting game 
were a common activity.115  Moreover, the idea that an individual had 
a right to protect his castle from all who threatened it was inherent in 
English common law.116  Therefore, it logically follows under the 
concept of liberty within the Constitution that self-protection and 
self-preservation are built into the Second Amendment.  Regardless 
of a person’s political view on gun control, the Supreme Court has 
ruled on this issue and has unequivocally stated that the right to bear 
arms is an individual right, which can be asserted outside the scope of 
the military for self-defense and sporting purposes.117  Yet, this indi-
vidual right is not without restrictions, and in order to maintain a civi-
 
Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and the more recent Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013.  
Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing; Josh Levs, Boy, 8, One of 3 Killed in 
Bombings at Boston Marathon; Scores Wounded, CNN (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/15/us/boston-marathon-explosions. 
111 Id. 
112 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038. 
113 See Walsh, supra note 74, at 642, 643-44 (internal citations omitted). 
114 Heller, 554 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 599. 
116 Christopher Reinhart, Castle Doctrine and Self-Defense, OLR RESEARCH REPORT (Jan. 
17, 2007), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-r-0052.htm. 
117 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
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lized society, it is important to incorporate these restrictions within 
the confines of the law.118 
C. Consequential Results 
Now that the Supreme Court has conferred an individual right 
to bear arms through the Second Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it is hard to ignore the el-
ephant in the room.  The harsh reality is that the Second Amendment 
creates “extraordinary social cost with little, if any, compensating so-
cial advantage.”119  For example, in 2010, an estimated 14,748 homi-
cides occurred in the United States with 68% of those committed 
through the use of guns.120  Unfortunately, in New York City, similar 
statistics show that in 2011, 61% of all murders involved a gun.121  
Clearly, these alarming statistics were not the Framers’ intent when 
constructing the Second Amendment. 
In contrast, a recent study conducted by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) found that England, a coun-
try with strict gun-control laws, had only forty-one deaths by firearms 
throughout the entire country in 2011.122  That equates to 6.6% of all 
homicides.123  Japan, an industrialized democracy, “has some of the 
strictest gun control laws” in the world and requires that applicants 
receive a mental health examination before obtaining a license.124  
Through legislation, Japan has created a virtual ban on private hand-
gun ownership.125  The same UNODC study indicates that there were 
eleven homicides by firearms throughout the nation.126  That is 1.8% 
of all homicides in the country.127  Lastly, Australia heavily regulates 
the issuance of handgun licenses and usually only permits licenses for 
“business owners for security” purposes and for “gun clubs for target 
 
118 Id. at 595. 
119 Levinson, supra note 24, at 655. 
120 See 2012 National Crime Victims’ Rights Week Resource Guide, supra note 8. 
121 See Murder in New York City 2011 Report, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
122 Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership Listed by Country, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 2012, 
8:01 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/jul/22/gun-homicides-ownership-
world-list#data. 
123 Id. 
124 Walsh, supra note 74, at 660, 661. 
125 Id. at 660. 
126 See Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership, supra note 122. 
127 Id. 
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shooting.”128  As a result of this regulation, handguns were responsi-
ble for the death of only thirty people on the entire continent.129  Why 
does the United States handgun homicide percentage compare to that 
of more turbulent countries like Colombia and Mexico as opposed to 
the less violent countries cited above?130  Is it because Americans are 
more prone to violent behavior or is it because those countries have 
more stringent regulations on deadly weapons?  Gun-rights activists 
argue that these differences are because of cultural and societal norms 
within those cited peaceful countries.131  That may very well be true.  
However, given the known dangers guns pose in the United States, 
reasonable regulation to prevent future violence is imperative. 
Working under the confines of the law, an absolute ban on 
handguns would not only be impractical—weapons would become 
the contraband of modern society similar to drugs or alcohol during 
the prohibition era—but also, unconstitutional.132  An absolute ban 
would keep guns out of the hands of law-abiding citizens, while crim-
inals and delinquents would maintain access through illegal means.  
Furthermore, there are an extraordinary number of guns already on 
the streets of the United States.  Nearly 88% of all Americans own 
some form of a firearm and removing these weapons from private 
possession would be nearly impossible.133  The only realistic solution 
to curtail this epidemic is to regulate firearms through legislation.  If 
the old adage “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”134 holds 
true, then those “people” should be limited in their ability to possess 
a deadly weapon.  As Justice Scalia stated in Heller, the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms is not absolute and can be subject to 
reasonable restrictions.135  It is necessary to tackle these tricky en-
deavors not only to curb the dire societal cost cited above, but also to 
ensure that those who possess a handgun license are competent to 
 
128 Walsh, supra note 74, at 660. 
129 See Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership, supra note 122. 
130 Id. 
131 David B. Kopel, Japanese Gun Control, 2 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 26, 41 (1993), available 
at http://www.guncite.com/journals/dkjgc.html. 
132 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
133 See Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership, supra note 122., at 3. 
134 William Saletan, Goon Control, SLATE MAG. (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/01/guns_don_t_kill_p
eople_people_kill_people_so_keep_dangerous_people_away.html. 
135 The term “reasonable restrictions” has not been defined, but will depend on the level of 
scrutiny applied. 
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do so. 
III. NEW YORK CITY’S LICENSING SCHEME 
A. Generally 
New York attempts to regulate the use and possession of 
handguns through Articles 265.00 and 400.00 of its Penal Code.136  
Article 265.00 creates a general ban on the possession of firearms 
subject to a few exceptions.137  The major exception allows an indi-
vidual to obtain a license to legally possess a handgun.138  Article 
400.00 is the “exclusive statutory mechanism for the licensing of 
firearms in New York State.”139  Licenses may only be obtained by 
individuals who are over the age of twenty-one.140  The applicant 
must be in good moral standing as evidenced through peer recom-
mendations.141  The individual must not have been convicted of a fel-
ony or other serious offense and must not have a history of mental 
disease.142 
The licensing process is handled principally on the local level 
and begins with a licensing officer.143  Every county has a different 
licensing form; yet each form must comply with certain statutory 
standards.144  These standards require the applicant to state his or her 
“full name, date of birth, residenc[y],” and occupation, as well as 
submit a photo taken in the last thirty days and present the application 
in person.145  The submission of an application triggers an investiga-
tion.146  This investigation entails local police exploring “the appli-
cant’s mental health history, criminal history, moral character, and, in 
the case of a carry license, representations of proper cause.”147 
 
136 N.Y. PENAL Law § 400.00 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00 (McKinney 
2013). 
137 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 2013). 
138 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20 (McKinney 2013). 
139 O’Connor v. Scarpino, 638 N.E.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1994). 
140 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2013). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2013). 
146 Id. 
147 Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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In New York City, the License Division of the New York City 
Police Department (“NYPD”) is charged with performing these in-
vestigations and issuing handgun licenses.148  The NYPD takes an 
applicant’s fingerprints and cross checks those prints against the da-
tabases of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the NICS to ensure statutory 
eligibility.149  The NYPD charges an applicant $340 as a processing 
fee and $91.50 as a fingerprint fee to perform these checks.150  Rights 
granted to the holder of the license vary according to the type of li-
cense issued and “expire on the first day of the second January after 
the date of issuance.”151 
Furthermore, under N.Y.C. Administration Code Section 10-
131,152 the Police Commissioner, who is deemed the licensing officer 
in New York City, is given great discretion to deny an application, 
especially with respect to carry licenses when applicants fail to prove 
proper cause.153  Specifically, under the New York State statute, the 
police commissioner may not approve an application if “good cause 
exists for the denial of the license.”154  Proper cause is not expressly 
defined within the statute.  However, it has been interpreted by New 
York state courts to mean “a special need for self-protection distin-
guishable from that of the general community . . . .”155  A decision by 
the Police Commissioner to deny a license application will not be 
overturned unless that decision was deemed to be “arbitrary and ca-
pricious.”156 
In sum, New York is considered a “may issue” state in which 
local authorities are granted the discretion to accept or deny a hand-
gun license application.157  In contrast, Kentucky is a “shall issue” 
 
148 NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/permits/handgun_licensing_application.shtml 
(follow “Click here to download License Application guide, Handgun License Application 
form” hyperlink to download Handgun License Application form). 
149 N. Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS: 2011 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 
(Sept. 2012), available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/2011-annual-
dcjs-performance-report.pdf. 
150 See NYC.GOV, supra note 148. 
151 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-131 (2012). 
152 Id. 
153 In re Papaioannou, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79. 
154 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(g). 
155 Bando v. Sullivan, 735 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002) (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted). 
156 In re Kaplan, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 68. 
157 Shall Issue, May Issue, No Issue, and Unrestricted States, BUCKEYE FIREARMS ASS’N, 
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state in which local authorities issue licenses unless explicit facts sur-
face that compel the denial of the application.158  There is no doubt 
that the process in New York State is tedious and time-consuming as 
compared to other states and it may take three to six months before 
an application is approved.159  Ultimately, if an individual seeks to 
exercise his or her right under the Second Amendment and possess a 
handgun in New York City, the means to do so are legally in place.  
Time and paperwork are small prices to pay to ensure that those who 
receive a license in New York City are competent, law-abiding citi-
zens. 
B. Is The Licensing Scheme Effective? 
The simple and short answer to this question is no.  Fatal gaps 
exist in the system, which allow persons who are afflicted with men-
tal diseases or defects to apply and obtain a handgun license.160  
Without question, over the last five years, New York has made great 
strides to ensure that medical records are submitted to the NICS in a 
timely manner.161  Roughly 271,837 background checks were per-
formed in New York State in 2011.162  More specifically, in New 
York City between the period of 2004 to 2006, 858 premise license 
handgun applications were submitted and 620 licenses were grant-
ed.163  This indicates a grant rate of 72%.  Within City limits, a com-
mon misnomer persists that applications for handgun licenses are de-
nied more often than not; however, the statistics tell another story. 
 
http://www.buckeyefirearms.org/node/6744 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
158 Id. 
159 Getting a NYC Handgun Permit, N.Y.C. GUNS, http://newyorkcityguns.com/getting-a-
nyc-handgun-permit/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
160 Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal Background Check System Puts 
Guns in the Hands of Killers, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, at 3, 
http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2013). 
161 Fatal Gaps: Can Dangerous People Buy Guns in Your State?, DEMAND ACTION TO 
END GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.demandaction.org/FatalGaps (click on the map of the Unit-
ed States to see statistics for the respective States) (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
162 Id. 
163 United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2012).  A Premises License is a 
restricted type of license.  See NYC.GOV, supra note 148.  It is issued for a residence or 
business.  Id.  The licensee may possess a handgun only on the premises of the address indi-
cated on the front of the license.  Id.  Licensees may also transport their handguns and am-
munition in separate locked containers, directly to and from an authorized range, or hunting 
location.  Id.  Handguns must be unloaded while being transported.  Id. 
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To assist the effectiveness of the background checks required 
by law, New York also submitted 186,999 medical records to NICS, 
which places the State within the top seven in the country for report-
ing.164  This action allows licensing officers to crosscheck the NICS 
database when investigating an application to ensure that those re-
questing a handgun license are mentally stable.165  This appears to be 
a promising statistic, but what about those individuals who never re-
ceive treatment and, in turn, never generate a medical record to report 
to NICS? 
A study performed in June 2004, reported in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, indicates that 35-40% of serious 
mental disease cases go untreated.166  The National Institute of Men-
tal Health estimated that in 2010, there were approximately 3.5 mil-
lion Americans who suffered from a severe mental illness, but were 
untreated.167  This represents roughly 1.5% of the population across 
the country.168  Accordingly, these individuals would not generate a 
medical file, as they are never diagnosed as mentally ill.  As a result, 
NICS would not flag these persons as unfit licensees. 
Individuals with a severe mental illness commit approximate-
ly 10% of all homicides and 50% of all mass killings,169 which 
amounts to roughly 1,400 deaths per year.170  An estimated 400,000 
Americans with untreated mental disease are currently incarcerated, 
which is 16% of the total inmate population.171  A study by Jeffrey 
Swanson at Duke University found that 33% of people with a serious 
mental illness reported past violent behavior, compared with 15% of 
people without a major mental disorder.172  Even though it is inaccu-
rate and unfair to characterize all individuals with a mental disease as 
 
164 Fatal Gaps: Can Dangerous People Buy Guns in Your State?, supra note 161. 
165 Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal Background Check System Puts 
Guns in the Hands of Killers, supra note 160, at 9. 
166 Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental Disorders: World 
Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (June 2, 2004), 
available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=198847#METHODS. 
167 Fast Facts, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/ 
problem/fast-facts (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Michael Luo, Gun Rights and Mental Illness: Answering Readers’ Questions, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/gun-rights-
and-mental-illness-answering-readers-questions/. 
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violent, society has regrettably created a strong negative stigma to-
ward this class of persons.173  However, this attitude should not deter 
society from rectifying a current social problem.  Just as it would be 
blatantly unreasonable to argue that a blind person has a right to pos-
sess a pilot’s license, it would also be equally irrational to allow an 
individual, who may be prone to violent tendencies, to possess a 
handgun.  Until gaps within the system are addressed and the NICS’s 
database is complete, the risk will remain that handguns may legally 
end up in the hands of the mentally unfit. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Before analyzing pertinent New York case law, a discussion 
is warranted to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny when re-
viewing restrictions on Second Amendment rights.  Despite lengthy 
opinions in both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court failed to 
articulate which level of scrutiny is appropriate if an individual 
claims a statute violated his or her right to bear arms.  However, in 
those cases, the Supreme Court did eliminate two levels of scrutiny 
from the discussion: rational basis review and an interest-balancing 
approach.174 
First, the rational basis review “requires a court to uphold 
regulation so long as it bears a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate 
governmental purpose.’ ”175  This creates a rebuttable presumption as 
to the constitutionality of the statute in question and the plaintiff 
bears the burden of showing that the law is unconstitutional.176  The 
Supreme Court in Heller concluded that an enumerated right within 
the Constitution required a more heightened level of scrutiny.177  The 
Court reasoned that if a rational basis review were applied, the Se-
cond Amendment would be reduced to mere words.178  Under this 
 
173 E. Fuller Torrey, Stigma and Violence: Isn’t It Time to Connect the Dots?, OXFORD 
JOURNALS SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN (Jun. 7, 2011), http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org/ 
content/early/2011/06/04/schbul.sbr057.full.pdf. 
174 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
175 Id. at 687-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 
(1993)). 
176 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed 
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws 
result in some inequality.”); see Craven, supra note 64, at 838. 
177 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
178 Id. 
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slack review, a state would be able to link gun restrictions and regula-
tion to public safety and create a virtual ban on handguns. 
Second, Justice Breyer in his dissent in Heller proposed a 
novel interest-balance approach, which required a court to consider 
the degree to which an individual’s right was burdened as compared 
to the governmental interest at issue.179  Although the majority did 
not expressly reject this proposition, it held that an interest-balance 
approach would shift power from the people to the judiciary to de-
termine the weight granted to an enumerated right.180  In other words, 
because the right to bear arms is an enumerated right established by 
the Second Amendment, the judiciary cannot value that right over 
any other within the Constitution.181  The very fact that the right to 
bear arms is enumerated provides a basis to conclude that our Found-
ing Fathers already performed this interest-balance test and estab-
lished its worth.182 
This leaves strict and intermediate scrutiny as the applicable 
standards.  Strict scrutiny mandates that the government demonstrate 
that the law is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.”183  
The phrase “narrowly tailored” simply implies that the law is the 
least restrictive means for achieving the compelling governmental in-
terest and there is no reasonable alternative to achieve that goal.184  
Strict scrutiny is applied when a substantial burden has been placed 
 
179 Id. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
180 Id. at 634-35 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
181 Id. 
182 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. 
183 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
184 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental rights’ . . . is to be 
subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government 
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”); Mark Tushnet, 
The Future of the Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 354, 359 (2008) (“[A] ‘funda-
mental’ right [can] be limited only for ‘compelling’ reasons, and even then only by regula-
tions that are pretty much guaranteed to accomplish real reductions in crime, violence, or 
gun violence.”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800-01 (2006) (“Narrow tailor-
ing requires that the law capture within its reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary 
to advance those compelling ends.  An alternative phrasing is that the law must be the ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ available to pursue those ends.  This inquiry into ‘fit’ between the 
ends and the means enables courts to test the sincerity of the government's claimed objec-
tive.”). 
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upon a fundamental right.185  Alternatively, under intermediate scru-
tiny, the government must demonstrate that the law is reasonably re-
lated to an important governmental interest.186  Intermediate scrutiny 
requires that a court analyze “whether the challenged law serves a 
substantial [governmental] interest and whether there is a reasonable 
fit between the objective and the law.”187 
Under strict scrutiny, because a state could easily show a 
compelling governmental interest in public safety and preventing 
crime, the issue would turn on whether the regulation was narrowly 
tailored to that interest.188  Traditionally, if a statute proves to be ef-
fective it will be deemed narrowly tailored to the purpose it purports 
to serve.189  However, courts are generally deferential to the legisla-
ture to determine whether a regulation is necessary or effective.190 
Therefore, when courts apply a strict scrutiny standard, they would be 
forced to speculate as to the effectiveness of a regulation or “whether 
[a] less burdensome regulation[] would be as effective.”191  Under-
standably, courts would prefer to base their decisions on reason, ra-
ther than speculation. 
For two reasons, most states, including New York, have 
adopted intermediate scrutiny when examining claims of Second 
Amendment violations.192  First, the language in Heller indicates that 
the right to bear arms is not an absolute right and can lawfully be sub-
ject to regulation.193  In Heller, Justice Scalia unequivocally approved 
 
185 See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed By Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of The Se-
cond Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 167, 186 (2008) (“[T]he general rule for laws 
burdening fundamental rights is strict scrutiny.”). 
186 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[The law] must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
187 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 83; Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
188 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling state in-
terest’ in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.  We have stressed that 
crime prevention is a ‘weighty social objective.’ ”) (citations omitted). 
189 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
190 Kachalsky v. Cnty of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In making this de-
termination [of whether regulation regarding public safety is necessary], ‘substantial defer-
ence to the predictive judgments of [the legislature]’ is warranted.  The Supreme Court has 
long granted deference to legislative findings regarding matters that are beyond the compe-
tence of courts.” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997))). 
191 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 83. 
192 Id. at 84. 
193 Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority implicitly, and appro-
priately, rejects” the strict scrutiny test by approving of the constitutional restrictions on the 
right to bear arms placed on concealed weapons, the mentally ill, and criminals.). 
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certain regulations including those prohibiting firearms in certain lo-
cations, such as schools, and prohibiting the carrying of a concealed 
weapon.194  These lawful regulations cannot be reconciled with a 
strict scrutiny analysis as it would be difficult to show whether these 
regulations are in fact narrowly tailored.195 
Second, because very few regulations would substantially 
burden the right to bear arms, few would require strict scrutiny analy-
sis.196  Since the core right recognized in Heller was an individual 
right to possess a firearm in the home for self-defense, only a regula-
tion that effectively creates a virtual ban on firearms could justify a 
strict scrutiny analysis.197  This virtual ban would surely qualify as a 
substantial burden on a fundamental right.  Because few statutes 
would create a virtual ban, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a 
majority of the Second Amendment inquiries.198 
V. NEW YORK’S SECOND AMENDMENT PRECEDENT 
It is clear from New York’s jurisprudence that possessing a 
handgun is a privilege, not a right, which can be subject to reasonable 
regulation.199  As stated above, individuals inflicted with a mental ill-
ness present a special concern for the public, and the government has 
an interest in maintaining the safety of its citizens.  Moreover, the 
Court in Heller approved of prohibitions on handgun possession by 
the mentally ill.200  Therefore, denying an individual a handgun li-
cense because of a mental disease is reasonable, as it affects a narrow 
class of persons and promotes general well-being.201  Specifically, 
New York’s licensing scheme has been challenged on many fronts 
 
194 Id. at 626 (majority opinion). 
195 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
196 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
197 Id. 
198 See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 687, 
716, 718 (2007) (analyzing how Supreme Courts in forty-two states have adopted a standard 
less than strict scrutiny when evaluating gun-laws). 
199 In re Papaioannou, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (holding that possession of a handgun license 
is a privilege, not a right which is subject to the broad discretion of the New York City Po-
lice Commissioner, and the Commissioner, by statute, has been delegated extraordinary 
power in such matters); In re Kaplan, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 66 (holding that the issuance of a pis-
tol license is not a right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation); In re Williams, 656 
N.Y.S.2d at 626 (holding the issuance of a license to carry a gun is a privilege, not a right). 
200 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
201 Id. 
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since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald.202  The 
arguments generally assert that the licensing scheme impermissibly 
infringes on an individual’s right to bear arms and plaintiffs claim 
constitutional protections through the Second Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.203  The overarching theme is that the license re-
quirement places an obstacle between a citizen and the right to own a 
gun and is thus unconstitutional. 
Many states, including Alabama, Texas, and Pennsylvania, do 
not require a license to possess or purchase a handgun.204  Further-
more, many states that do require a license are “shall issue” states, 
which lower the threshold to obtain a license to a dangerous level.205  
The challenges cited below are not without merit.  However, time and 
time again, New York and federal courts have upheld the state and 
City’s licensing scheme holding that the State has a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens through gun 
regulation.206  Therefore, New York can reasonably regulate through 
its licensing scheme without violating the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, the Equal Protections Clause, or the Due Process Clause.  
Furthermore, New York can require a fee from an applicant to obtain 
a license so long as the fee defrays the administrative costs of the 
state and does not place an undue burden on an individual’s exercise 
of a constitutional right.207 
 
202 See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (challenging New York’s licensing scheme on 
the ground that the special need requirement was a substantial burden on an individual’s 
right to bear arms); People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty Dec. 15, 
2010) (challenging the state’s licensing scheme because when combined with the criminali-
zation of possession of a handgun without a license, a ban on handguns was created); 
Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 72 (challenging the state’s licensing scheme based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Due Process Clause, and Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
203 Id. 
204 Gun Laws Permits Statistics—States Compared; STATEMASTER.COM, 
http://www.statemaster.com/graph/gov_gun_law_per-government-gun-laws-permitsPage% 
201%20of%205 (last visited May 3, 2013). 
205 Id. (including Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina); see Getting a 
NYC Handgun Permit, supra note 159. 
206 See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (upholding New York’s licensing scheme’s re-
quirement of showing a special need); People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (upholding state’s 
licensing scheme because it did not create a ban on handguns); Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 72 
(upholding the state’s licensing scheme through challenges on Equal Protection, Due Pro-
cess, and Privileges and Immunities grounds). 
207 Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that a state can place 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on a constitutional right for public safety rea-
sons and so long as the restrictions are not intended to generate revenue or create an undue 
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In Osterweil v. Bartlett,208 the plaintiff asserted that his rights 
under the “United States Constitution, the New York Constitution, 
and the New York State Civil Rights Law” were violated when his 
handgun permit application was denied.209  The plaintiff was a New 
York State resident who applied for a handgun license.210  In the 
midst of the application and investigation process, the plaintiff moved 
and changed his state of residency.211  The licensing officer promptly 
denied the application and informed the plaintiff that because he was 
no longer a resident of New York State, he was no longer eligible to 
obtain a New York State handgun license.212 
At trial, the court rejected the plaintiff’s Second Amendment 
claim under an intermediate scrutiny standard holding that the State 
had a compelling governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the 
general public and its residency requirement was reasonably related 
to that interest.213  The court reasoned that requiring New York to 
monitor applicants who live out-of-state placed an excessive burden 
on the State and “the State must be afforded wider latitude to combat 
the great social harm inflicted by gun violence.”214  The court then re-
jected the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim, holding that residents 
and non-residents are not similarly situated because New York could 
monitor its own residents with greater feasibility.215  As such, New 
York could deny the application and nonresidents could not seek pro-
tection under the Equal Protection Clause.216 
Lastly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.217  The plaintiff argued the licens-
ing scheme “penalize[d] him from travelling and spending time out-
side of New York.”218  The court promptly rejected this argument 
holding a state may restrict an individual’s ability to travel if the state 
can show that the restriction is reasonably related to a substantial 
 
burden). 
208 819 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
209 Id. at 74-75. 
210 Id. at 75. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 76. 
213 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 84, 85. 
214 Id. at 86. 
215 Id. at 86-87. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 88. 
218 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
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governmental interest.219  As stated above, the court held the State 
had a compelling governmental interest and that interest was fur-
thered through its licensing scheme;220 therefore, the State could re-
strict the plaintiff’s ability to change residency.221 
In Kwong v. Bloomberg,222 the plaintiffs brought a Section 
1983 action against Mayor Bloomberg, the City of New York, and 
the State Attorney General, alleging that the $340 application pro-
cessing fee was unconstitutional because it placed a burden on their 
ability to possess a handgun, a right guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment.223  The court looked to the Supreme Court’s fee juris-
prudence for guidance.224  These cases addressed the imposition of 
administrative fees on constitutionally protected activities, which is 
analogous to the issue in Kwong.  In Cox v. New Hampshire,225 the 
Supreme Court made clear the government could not tax, for the sole 
purpose of generating revenue, individuals who exercised a protected 
constitutional activity.226  However, the Supreme Court concluded a 
government could impose a fee in order to offset administrative and 
maintenance costs.227 
Specifically in Cox, the Court upheld a state statute that re-
quired individuals exercising their First Amendment right to assem-
ble to obtain a license and pay a fee of $300.228  The Court concluded 
the fee was “not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident 
to the administration of the [right to assemble] and to the mainte-
nance of public order in the matter licensed.”229  Clearly, this stand-
ard is not without limits, as evidenced by the Court’s decision in 
Murdoch v. Pennsylvania.230  In Murdoch, the Court invalidated a fee 
which required individuals exercising their First Amendment right of 
freedom of religion to pay a $1.50 license fee before distributing lit-
 
219 Id. at 87-88. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 876 F. Supp. 2d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
223 Id. at 248. 
224 Id. at 253-54. 
225 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
226 Id. at 577. 
227 Id. at 576-78. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 577. 
230 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
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erature.231  Holding the fee unconstitutional, the Court concluded this 
fee was “a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by 
the Bill of Rights” and not “imposed as a regulatory measure to de-
fray the expense of policing the activities in question.”232 
Applying these standards to the facts, the Kwong court con-
cluded the $340 handgun-licensing fee was constitutional.233  The 
court reached this reasonable decision by looking at the User Cost 
Analysis performed by New York City’s Office of Budget Manage-
ment, which calculated that the cost to the City for each handgun li-
cense was $977.16 as of 2010.234  The $340 license fee to the appli-
cant represents only 34.79% of the cost to the City.235  Therefore, it 
was clear the fee was a way in which the city offset the costs it in-
curred to process each application.  Furthermore, the fee could not 
reasonably be construed as a flat tax utilized to burden an individual 
from exercising a protected constitutional right because without pass-
ing some costs to the applicant, license applications would contribute 
to the financial instability of the City. 
In sum, these cases indicate New York’s licensing scheme 
falls well within the framework set forth in Heller and McDonald, as 
it furthers the state’s interests of public safety.  Ensuring the compe-
tence and mental stability of those individuals who can legally pur-
chase handguns is in the best interest of the public at large.  New 
York can reasonably regulate through its licensing scheme without 
violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection 
Clause, or the Due Process Clause.  Lastly, New York can require a 
fee from the applicant to obtain a license, so long as the fee is intend-
ed to defray the administrative costs of the state and does not place an 
undue burden on an individual’s exercise of a constitutional right. 
 
231 Id. at 106, 113, 116-17.  The Court looks to determine the purpose behind the fee.  If 
the fee is used to simply defray costs of administrative expenses, the fee will be constitution-
al.  On the other hand, if the fee is nominal and only acts as a tax—or an astronomical fee, 
which acts as a burden on the exercise of a constitutional right—the fee will be unconstitu-
tional.  Id. 
232 Id. at 113-14. 
233 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
234 Id. at 257. 
235 Id. 
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VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NEW YORK LICENSING 
SCHEME 
A. The Proposal 
Before any proposal to amend New York’s licensing scheme 
can be articulated, one must determine who is in the best position to 
assess the mental health of an individual: a judge, a police commis-
sioner, a licensing officer, or a mental health professional.  As noted 
in detail above, many individuals who apply for handgun licenses are 
never diagnosed as mentally ill, and therefore never generate a record 
that a background check might discover.  According to the National 
Alliance on Mental Illness, approximately 10% of children and ado-
lescents suffer from mental illnesses.236  Yet only 20% of this group 
have been diagnosed and are receiving medical care.237  Specifically, 
of those adults who are of age to apply for a handgun license, approx-
imately one in seventeen live with a serious mental disorder such as 
schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder.238  Yet, less than 
one-third receive mental health services.239  Therefore, the numbers 
indicate that two-thirds of adults who suffer from a significant mental 
disorder are neither under the care of a physician nor do they have a 
medical file indicating such a condition.  That leaves approximately 
350,000 people over the age of 18 in New York City who have an 
undiagnosed mental disease.240  Under the current system, the licens-
ing officer is charged with the task of determining whether an indi-
vidual is mentally stable to possess a handgun based on an informal 
 
236 National Alliance on Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about 
mental illness (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
237 Stacey McMorrow & Embrey Howell, State Mental Health Systems for Children: A 
Review of the Literature and Data Sources, URBAN INSTITUTE (July 2010), 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=child_and_teen_support&template=/Content 
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=106948. 
238 Mental Illness: Facts and Numbers, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, availa-
ble at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=About_Mental_Illness&Template=/Content 
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=53155. 
239 Id. 
240 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/ 
popcur.shtml (last visited May 3, 2013) (noting that the July 2011 census approximated that 
8,244,910 people live in New York City); United States Census Bureau, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited May 3, 
2013) (noting that 78.4% of the population in New York City is over the age of eighteen). 
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interview, and, occasionally, character references.241  Consequently, 
these people would be deemed legally eligible to purchase a handgun 
because they would pass the background check during the licensing 
process. 
A solution presented by those on both sides of the political 
aisle after the Sandy Hook shooting is to overhaul mental health ser-
vices “focusing on early intervention and stigma issues related to 
mental illness.”242  While this is a viable option, its impact would not 
appear for many years.  It is unlikely that “early intervention” would 
prevent an adult from applying and receiving a handgun license to-
day.  Instead, preventative measures are needed to ensure that those 
who apply and receive a handgun license are not a danger to them-
selves or others in the community.  A simple psychiatric screening 
and assessment at the time one applies for a license could eliminate 
any doubt from the equation.243 
Some mental health professionals argue that a psychiatric 
screening would provide little assistance in determining whether an 
individual has a propensity to act violently.244  Barry Rosen, a profes-
sor of psychology at Fordham University, stated that when he is 
called to assess the violent tendencies of a patient, he “typically [has] 
the benefit of a lengthy face-to-face interview, records on their crimi-
nal and mental health history, [and] a tremendous amount of infor-
mation at [his] disposal that the typical mental health professional on 
the fly simply doesn’t have.”245  Although a valid point, the psychiat-
ric assessment proposed here is not for the purpose of determining if 
an individual has violent tendencies, but rather to assess an individu-
al’s mental fitness. 
This methodology is analogous to the mental health screening 
and coordination of care by the United States Army for soldiers de-
 
241 NYPD—PERMITS, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/permits/handgun_licensing_ 
information.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
242 Catherine Ho, Sandy Hook Shooting Reshapes the Lobbying Landscape on Gun Laws, 
Mental Health Services, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 06, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-06/business/36208735_1_gun-laws-gun-control-
mental-health. 
243 Scott Hewitt, Can Mental Health Treatment Help Halt Gun Violence?, THE 
COLUMBIAN (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/feb/17/can-mental-
health-help-halt-mayhem/. 
244 Jon Hamilton, Mental Health Gun Laws Unlikely to Reduce Shootings, NPR (Jan. 16, 
2013, 4:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/17/169529792/mental-health-gun-
laws-unlikely-to-reduce-shootings. 
245 Id. 
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ployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  Before deployment, each soldier un-
dergoes a mental health screening to determine that individual’s men-
tal stability before entering combat.246  These screenings caused a 
drastic reduction in the number of soldiers who experienced mental 
health problems, medical evacuations from Iraq for mental health 
reasons, and suicidal ideation.247  The Army saw roughly 75% fewer 
soldiers treated for psychiatric disorders as compared to those bri-
gades who were not pre-screened on their pre-deployment physi-
cal.248  This figure indicates the effectiveness of basic mental health 
screenings in determining the mental stability of individuals. 
In addition, every law enforcement agency in the country re-
quires each potential candidate to undergo a mental evaluation.249  
Specifically in New York City, police officers undergo a mental 
evaluation to determine, among other things, their suitability to carry 
a weapon.250  This process includes a questionnaire and an interview 
with a trained mental health professional.251  In 2011, the NYPD re-
ported only two incidents in which an officer intentionally used his 
weapon for an unauthorized purpose.252  Admittedly, these numbers 
may be skewed because higher figures would reflect poorly on the 
Department as a whole.  However, mandating mental evaluations for 
all prospective candidates on the NYPD emphasizes the importance 
of ensuring that only those mentally competent possess a firearm. 
In short, the proposed amendment is quite simple and has 
great potential to be an effective tool.  All applicants wishing to ob-
tain a handgun license must undergo a basic psychiatric evaluation 
 
246 Charley Keyes, Army to Implement New Mental Health Screening Procedures, CNN 
U.S. (Jan. 19, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-19/us/military.mental.health_ 
1_suicidal-ideation-predeployment-screening-process-combat-stress?_s=PM:US. 
247 Effectiveness of Mental Health Screening and Coordination of In-Theater Care Prior 
to Deployment to Iraq: a Cohort Study, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Jun. 2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21245086. 
248 Id. 
249 Yossef S. Ben-Porath, et. al., Assessing the Psychological Suitability of Candidates for 
Law Enforcement Positions, THE POLICE CHIEF (Aug. 2011), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/ 
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2448&issue_id=82011. 
250 Psychological Exams and Standards, AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES: 
EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AGENCIES, http://www.aele.org/law/Digests/ 
empl165.html (last visited May 3, 2013). 
251 NYPD—APPLICATION PROCESS, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/careers/application_ 
overview.shtml (last visited May 3, 2013). 
252 New York City Police Department: Annual Firearms Discharge Report, NYPD, 2011, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/nypd_annual_ 
firearms_discharge_report_2011.pdf. 
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and assessment by a trained mental health professional to determine 
their suitability to possess a weapon at an additional cost of $100.  
This charge in combination with the statutory licensing fee would 
bring the total cost to $531.50.  This requirement is in addition to 
character statements written by colleagues and friends, as well as an 
interview with a licensing officer who would ask questions about the 
application as a whole.  Although this process may seem redundant, 
this duplication ensures accuracy and reliability.  It also places indi-
viduals who are trained to observe the warning signs of mentally un-
stable individuals at the forefront of the licensing process. 
B. Is The Proposed Amendment Constitutional? 
The proposed amendment may confront two constitutional 
challenges.  The first argument might involve claims that the provi-
sion places an undue burden on an individual’s right to bear arms un-
der the Second Amendment.  Under this premise, an individual may 
claim this regulation impermissibly and arbitrarily requires citizens to 
jump through yet another hoop to obtain a handgun license, eliminat-
ing their ability to defend themselves.  The second argument might be 
that the additional fee of $100 acts as a tax and a deterrent on a con-
stitutionally protected right which only the wealthy could overcome.  
Both arguments must fail as the case law indicates courts have con-
tinually given states wide latitude to regulate guns through licensing 
and processing schemes inasmuch as such regulation does not 
amount to a complete ban.253 
Addressing the first argument, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority in Heller, stated, “Like most rights, the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited.”254  “[T]he right was not a right 
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose,”255 meaning the government could legally 
regulate the type of weapon, the type of individual, and the location 
in which a weapon could be carried.256  Furthermore, Scalia endorses 
 
253 See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (upholding New York’s licensing scheme’s re-
quirement of showing a special need); People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (upholding state’s 
licensing scheme because it did not create a ban on handguns); Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d 
72 (upholding the state’s licensing scheme through challenges on Equal Protection, Due Pro-
cess, and Privileges and Immunities grounds). 
254 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 626-27. 
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such regulation, which prohibits possession by the mentally ill.257  
The provision proposed clearly does not rise to the level of the stat-
utes at issue in Heller or McDonald, as it cannot reasonably be con-
strued to place a complete ban on handguns.258  A New York City 
resident can still demonstrate cause and need for a handgun license, 
undergo a basic psychiatric evaluation, pay the required fee, and rea-
sonably expect that a license will be granted. 
Even though the Supreme Court has declined to declare the 
proper level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment re-
strictions, the majority of jurisdictions have determined that interme-
diate scrutiny is appropriate.259  Under intermediate scrutiny, this 
amendment to the licensing scheme will pass constitutional muster.  
Admittedly, Justice Alito determined the right to bear arms was “fun-
damental” in McDonald,260 which in theory should trigger strict scru-
tiny.  However, as stated earlier, only regulations that substantially 
burden a protected constitutional right require a heightened analy-
sis.261  Because this provision would only have a direct effect on 
those who are legally prohibited from possessing a gun, a relatively 
narrow class, it cannot be argued that this amendment places a sub-
stantial burden on every individual’s right to bear arms.262  The aver-
age citizen applying for a license would be unaffected, except for 
having to speak to a trained mental health professional.  An inter-
view, which may last an hour at the most, should not constitute an 
undue burden because this amount of time is reasonable. 
Under an intermediate scrutiny test, the provision should be 
valid because it serves substantial state interests and reasonably re-
lates to achieving those state interests.  The governmental interests at 
 
257 Id. 
258 See generally id. at 574-75 (holding that the District of Columbia’s statute created a 
virtual ban on handguns because residents were unable to carry unregistered firearms and 
registration of firearms was prohibited); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (holding Chicago 
statute invalid because it criminalized the possession of firearms). 
259 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
260 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-37. 
261 See Klukowski, supra note 185. 
262 Challenges asserting equal protection violations have not been directly addressed by 
case law.  The logical argument is that not all individuals with a mental illness are violent 
and thus the amendment treats the mentally ill differently from others.  However, the state 
has a compelling governmental interest in public safety.  The class created does not have to 
be a perfect fit, but rather the class must substantially relate to the important governmental 
interest stated above.  Hence, because the state has reason to believe the mentally ill pose a 
danger to society if allowed to possess a handgun, it can constitutionally limit their access to 
handguns. 
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hand are ensuring safety to the general public, crime prevention, and 
preservation of human life.  The Supreme Court has deemed these in-
terests to be not only “legitimate,”263 but also “compelling.”264  It is 
beyond dispute that these interests are deeply rooted in any civilized 
society as evidenced by homicide statutes, the banning of assisted-
suicide, and regulations on abortion.265  In fact, when the Supreme 
Court determined a public safety issue or a threat to human life exist-
ed, restrictions on individual liberties were deemed justified.266 
More importantly, the provision reasonably relates to achiev-
ing this governmental interest.  Pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, 
states have the police power to enact legislation to ensure the safety 
and welfare of its citizens.267  New York has asserted this authority 
through the licensing scheme at issue.  It is clear New York City ra-
tionally believed crime would be diminished and lives would be 
saved if it could ensure handguns would only be in the hands of indi-
viduals who were competent and who demonstrated a “special 
need.”268  Therefore, it enacted its licensing scheme, which has with-
stood several constitutional attacks.269 
Similarly, the provision suggested serves the purpose to pre-
vent those who may be prone to violent behavior from acquiring a 
deadly weapon.  As noted earlier, persons with mental disease fre-
 
263 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (holding federal govern-
ment has “compelling interests in public safety”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 25-26 
(1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (commenting that in the Fourth Amendment context there 
is an “important public interest in crime prevention and detection”); Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the com-
munity from crime cannot be doubted.  We have stressed before that crime prevention is ‘a 
weighty social objective’ . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); See generally Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990). 
264 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. 
265 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (banning assisted suicide); 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (restricting types of abortions). 
266 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (restricting First Amendment 
free speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (restricting First Amendment re-
ligious freedom); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-04 (2006) (restricting Fourth 
Amendment protection within the home); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) 
(restricting Fifth Amendment prophylactic through Miranda). 
267 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
268 Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 256 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980). 
269 See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (upholding New York’s licensing scheme’s re-
quirement of showing a special need); People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (upholding state’s 
licensing scheme because it did not create a ban on handguns); Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d 
72 (upholding the state’s licensing scheme through challenges on Equal Protection, Due Pro-
cess, and Privileges and Immunities grounds). 
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quently are undiagnosed and can be prone to violent behavior.270  The 
mental health assessment’s goal is to identify these prospective unfit 
candidates and eliminate them from the applicant pool.  By prevent-
ing these individuals from obtaining a handgun license, it will inhibit 
them from legally purchasing a handgun, which in turn will preclude 
subsequent violent acts.  The interview can only have a positive ef-
fect: those who are competent will be unaffected in their pursuit of a 
license whereas applicants who are deemed “mentally unstable” will 
be denied. 
The next argument may concern the imposition of an addi-
tional cost of $100.  The opposition might suggest that this cost is a 
tax imposed to deter individuals from exercising their constitutional 
right to bear arms—a tax which only the wealthy can afford.  How-
ever, as stated above, the government can legally place a fee on con-
stitutionally protected activities to offset administrative and mainte-
nance costs.271  Here, the processing cost on handgun applications for 
New York City is $977.16.272  On average, a psychiatrist will be 
compensated $90 for a 45-minute session by insurance companies.273  
This would bring the total cost for the city to $1,067.16.  The $531.50 
cost to applicants accounts for roughly 50% of the cost to the City. 
It cannot be reasonably argued that this cost has a purpose 
other than to defray administrative costs to the City.  If the City did 
not charge a fee or kept the fee at its current level, it would lose over 
$400 per application, a result which would outrage the average tax-
payer.  Admittedly, other jurisdictions charge less for a license; how-
ever, this does not establish that the $440 fee at issue is excessive.274  
Furthermore, courts have upheld much larger fees charged for consti-
tutionally protected activities.275 
 
270 See Fast Facts, supra note 167. 
271 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
272 Id. at 257. 
273 Gardiner Harris, Talk Doesn’t Pay, So Psychiatry Turns Instead to Drug Therapy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/health/policy/06doctors.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
274 729, Inc. v. Kenton Cnty. Fiscal Court, 402 F. App’x 131, 134 (6th Cir. 2010) (reject-
ing plaintiff’s argument that the amount of the licensing fee was unreasonable because other 
jurisdictions charged lower fees). 
275 Id. at 135 (holding that a $3,000 adult business licensing fee was not constitutionally 
excessive); Coal for Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding festival permit fees ranging from $950 to $6500). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent mass shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School 
and in Aurora, Colorado by mentally unstable individuals have 
placed gun control back into the political spotlight.  Statistics indicate 
that the use of handguns is the leading cause of homicides in the 
United States.  Furthermore, individuals who are mentally ill have a 
higher propensity to act in a violent way than those who are mentally 
stable.  Therefore, logically, decreasing the number of handguns in 
the hands of mentally ill individuals will decrease the amount of vio-
lence caused by the mentally ill without violating the constitutional 
rights of others.  New York has taken steps to close many loopholes 
in the NICS and done an admirable job in reporting mental health 
records to the agencies that perform background checks.  However, 
more can be done to ensure safer streets. 
An additional amendment to New York City’s licensing 
scheme can assist licensing officers in identifying and distinguishing 
those who are legally competent to possess a handgun from those 
who are not.  Every applicant who desires to obtain a handgun license 
must first go through a basic mental health assessment with a mental 
health professional to determine his or her eligibility.  This require-
ment is similar to regulations within the Army, law enforcement 
agencies, and in Japan, which exist to confirm a person’s sanity and 
mental clarity.  Under intermediate scrutiny the amendment is consti-
tutional because the state has a substantial governmental interest in 
preventing crime and the provision is substantially related to achiev-
ing that state interest.  New York City has the largest population of 
any city in the country and it has a legitimate interest in keeping 
handguns out of the hands of the mentally ill, both diagnosed and un-
diagnosed.  This proposed amendment serves that purpose effectively 
and does not pose any threat to those who desire to own a handgun 
for a legitimate purpose.  The bottom line is simple: if this amend-
ment will prevent one gun from landing in the hand of just one men-
tally ill person, then it is an effective and a worthwhile endeavor. 
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